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Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay: UK Evidence 
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript type: Empirical 
Research Question/ Issue: This paper provides new evidence on the effect of compensation 
consultants on CEO pay.  
Research Findings/ Insights: We produce new evidence on the managerial power approach 
(MPA) to corporate governance by examining the influence of compensation consultants on 
CEO pay structures and the decision to hire a compensation consultant in the UK. We find 
evidence that is not consistent with the MPA. Contrary to the MPA predictions, we find that the 
positive effect of consultants on CEO pay levels mainly stems from an increase in equity based 
compensation. We show that consultants exert a negative influence on basic (cash) pay. In 
addition, we illustrate that the choice of hiring a consultant can be explained by economic 
determinants, e.g. firm governance characteristics. The existence of a powerful CEO does not 
increase the likelihood of hiring a pay consultant. The results are robust to several model 
specifications and tests for selection bias.  
Theoretical/Academic Implications: The results indicate that compensation consultants may 
have a positive effect on the structure of CEO pay since they encourage incentive based 
compensation. We also show that economic determinants, rather than CEO power, explain the 
decision to hire compensation consultants. Overall, our results cast doubts on the conclusions of 
the MPA regarding the role of compensation consultants. Their role can be better explained 
within the optimal contracting framework. 
Practitioner/Policy implications: This study offers insights to the positive effect the hiring of a 
pay consultant could have towards the design of a CEO pay contract.  
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Compensation Consultants, Executive Compensation.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Compensation consultants play a significant role within a corporation’s governance structure. 
Their widespread use seems to indicate that firms recognise there is value in the services offered 
by them. Policy makers also appear to acknowledge the importance of pay consultants and have 
recently called for more information disclosure regarding their role within organisations. Even 
though market participants agree that pay consultants have now become key players for firms’ 
internal corporate governance strategies, their effect on the pay contracts remains ambiguous and 
highly contested. The debate turns on whether consultants either enhance the ability of 
shareholders to offer optimal pay contracts or collude with the management to allow the latter to 
expropriate shareholders’ wealth. This paper offers evidence regarding this debate. We 
investigate the effect consultants have on both the levels and structure of CEO pay. We also 
examine whether it is CEO power or other economic reasons that determine the choice of hiring 
a compensation consultant. 
From an optimal contracting perspective an efficient managerial compensation contract 
should assure the alignment of interests between risk averse managers and the shareholders of 
the firm. However, the determination of the level and structure of an executive pay package is a 
process which is complicated and requires expert knowledge. One might expect firms to hire 
expert outsiders to offer their advice on this process. With the use of a number of tools (surveys, 
valuation methods) and their expert knowledge on market-wide compensation practices, pay 
consultants can help firms determine an optimal executive compensation package and avoid 
costly mistakes.  
Recent studies though offer an alternative explanation for the use of pay consultants. The 
managerial power approach (MPA) (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002) argues that 
compensation consultants help the management team of a company camouflage the extraction of 
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 3 
rents, i.e. excessive pay. Consultants, who are considered by the markets to be independent of the 
company, offer legitimacy to sub-optimal compensation plans and allow managers to expropriate 
shareholders’ wealth by awarding themselves above optimal levels of pay. This happens for two 
reasons. First, managers, especially CEOs, have mutually supportive relationships1 with their 
boards of directors, which allow them to gain power within the firm. CEOs may abuse this power 
and, among other things, try to control the design of the compensation package in order to 
achieve excessive pay in the form of rents. Second, consultants are influenced by the intra-
company power relationships and try to please the CEO and not the shareholders, since they 
understand the CEO has more influence in the hiring decision than shareholders.  
In this study, we find that CEOs of companies that employ compensation consultants enjoy 
higher levels of total compensation but we also demonstrate that this is due to a higher 
proportion of performance-related, equity based compensation. This result shows that even 
though the existence of a consultant is indeed related with higher levels of top-executive pay, this 
extra pay is incentive related. In addition, we model the choice of hiring a pay consultant. Based 
on the managerial power hypothesis, one would expect more powerful CEOs to increase the 
likelihood of the firm hiring a pay consultant. We find no evidence to support this argument. In 
particular, more entrenched CEOs either have no effect or decrease the likelihood of firms hiring 
pay consultants. Other “rational” economic determinants, e.g. corporate governance and 
ownership structure among others, help explain the hiring choice. Finally, we examine whether 
the effect of compensation consultants on CEO pay still exists after incorporating the selection 
issue in our initial analysis, thus controlling for potential selection biases. Our results cast doubts 
on the managerial power perspective on the role of compensation consultants and in particular on 
the claim that powerful CEOs hire consultants to help them extract rents.  
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This paper contributes several original findings on the relationship between CEO 
compensation and the use of compensation consultants. First, using a more comprehensive 
sample compared to prior UK studies in the area, we find an increasing effect of consultants on 
total CEO pay; this finding is consistent with the “ratcheting-up” effect predicted by the 
managerial power hypothesis. We find this effect, unlike prior UK studies, because we use a 
larger sample which is more representative of the UK population. This allows more variation 
both in the levels of CEO pay and in the choice of hiring a consultant. Second, our analysis 
shows that compensation consultants have an increasing effect on the equity based portion of 
compensation. However, in contrast to other studies we show that they also have a decreasing 
effect on the salary portion of top-executive pay contracts. This result is important because it 
indicates that compensation consultants have an effect on the structure of CEO compensation, 
which is consistent with the calls from market participants for more pay for performance. We 
appropriately control for potential selection bias issues and our results remain statistically 
significant. 
Finally, our study contributes new insights into the selection process of consultants and the 
reasons that drive firms to hire them. Different proxies of CEO power appear to be 
insignificantly or even negatively related to the probability of hiring a pay consultant. In contrast, 
we show that the complexity of the pay package is a significant factor in the decision to hire a 
consultant. These results point towards the conclusion that compensation consultants are not 
considered as part of the agency problem, as argued by the managerial power hypothesis, but as 
part of the solution, i.e. contribute towards the achievement of an optimal contract.  
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PRIOR RESEARCH 
The majority of the relevant literature studies the role of compensation consultants on the 
determination of the levels and structure of executive pay. Bebchuk et al. (2002) provide a 
“managerial power” perspective on the determination of executive pay, where consultants play a 
sinister role. Company executives achieve excessive remuneration in the form of rents, based on 
the power that they have within a firm and consultants are hired to assist them to “camouflage” 
(p.791) and justify their pay. This camouflage comes mostly through the use of tools that 
consultants are using for the determination of executive pay, e.g. remuneration surveys and 
compensation peer groups, as a number of studies claim (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1998; 
Bizjak, Lemmon and Naveen, 2007; Murphy, 1998; Wade, Porac and Pollock, 1997).  
There are only a few studies examining empirically this line of argument. In the US, 
managerial compensation levels are higher for firms that use consultants compared to those that 
do not, after controlling for other economic determinants of executive pay (Armstrong, Ittner and 
Larcker, 2009; Conyon, Peck, Read and Sadler, 2009a). However, this result does not seem to 
hold for UK firms (Conyon et al., 2009a). Moreover, compensation consultants have an 
increasing effect on the equity based part of executive pay both in the US and the UK (Conyon et 
al., 2009a). With the use of matching pairs for economic and corporate governance 
characteristics, Armstrong et al. (2009) show that the higher pay in firms with consultants can 
also be attributed to differences in corporate governance and not solely to the choice of hiring a 
consultant.  
An issue that has also concerned two studies is the incentives of compensation consultants 
and whether their advice could be biased in the presence of potential cross-selling interests. 
Cadman, Carter and Hillegeist (2010) find that firms which hire consultants with higher conflicts 
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of interest (i.e. consultants that also offer non-compensation related consultancy services to their 
clients) do not have higher levels of total pay or lower pay performance sensitivity. Their results 
do not change significantly after controlling for selection biases. Unlike Cadman et al. (2010), 
Murphy and Sandino (2010) find some evidence that CEO pay is higher in US firms which have 
hired compensation consultants firms for extra services. Their results are stronger for Canadian 
firms.  
To our knowledge, this is the first study that directly tests the arguments of the managerial 
power hypothesis regarding the role of compensation consultants and in particular, the 
relationship between CEO power and the consultant choice. Using a more comprehensive sample 
of UK firms from the FTSE 100, 250 and Small Cap indexes of the London Stock Exchange 
compared to other studies (Conyon et al., 2009a), we investigate the whole structure of UK CEO 
pay. As we show later in our paper, there is a significant clustering of pay consultants in the UK 
market and this implies that a large sample of firms is needed in order to draw safe conclusions- 
a fact that has been overlooked by prior UK studies. More importantly, we also test for biases in 
the consultant selection process in a more appropriate way compared to Cadman et al. (2010). 
Overall, we believe that our study gives a more comprehensive and to a certain extent different 
perspective of the relationship between CEO compensation and consultants. 
THE UK SETTING 
There are a number of reasons why a study of the use of consultants by UK firms is 
interesting. The level of disclosure in executive compensation practices by UK firms is unique in 
Europe and can only be compared with that of the US market (Bauwhede and Wilekens, 2008). 
The remuneration committee reports in UK firms’ annual reports provide not only detailed 
information on the levels and structure of executive pay, but also comprehensive details on the 
outside consultancy that the committee hires. This information has been available for US firms 
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under legislation introduced in as late as 2006 (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2006), 
which requires the provision of a “Compensation Disclosure and Analysis” (CD & A) report in 
the annual proxy statements of firms that also includes the disclosure of the use of compensation 
consultants. For the UK market, detailed corporate governance information has been available 
since the introduction of the initial Combined Code on Corporate Governance (1998), and 
sufficient details on compensation consultants are available since 2003. Apart from the similarity 
in disclosure requirements and hence information availability, the two markets, i.e. US and UK, 
differ significantly.  
Even though the UK has a stock market based economy, like the US, it arguably has a 
number of features that distinguish it from the US economy. Bush (2005) argues that UK 
shareholders are more powerful than US shareholders and that there are significant differences in 
their rights and responsibilities. Institutional ownership in the UK is far more concentrated 
compared to the US. UK institutional shareholders hold a much higher collective percentage of 
shares of quoted companies, compared to their US counterparts (Mallin, 1996). Moreover, the 
UK corporate governance framework is mainly based on codes of good practice and 
recommendations, while the US one entails more legislative features. In addition, although very 
similar in many aspects, there are significant executive pay differences between the UK and US 
that are mainly attributed to cultural disparities (Conyon and Murphy, 2000). For example, there 
is a higher degree of tolerance for highly paid executives in the US compared to the UK. All 
these parameters can have important implications for the intra-company power sharing as well as 
the CEO’s ability to extract “rents”, as defined by Bebchuk et al. (2002). Thus, the investigation 
of the managerial power predictions in the UK is not only important but gives indirect evidence 
on the effect of market-wide governance systems on firm specific issues. 
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THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The Role of Pay Consultants under a Managerial Power Perspective 
All our main hypotheses are related to the predictions of the MPA, as developed by Bebchuk 
et al. (2002). The MPA should not be viewed as a new theory, but rather as an extension of the 
classic agency theory model. It attempts to explain executive pay related practices that do not 
seem to be in accordance with optimal contracting. Although the underlying assumptions of 
agency theory still hold under the MPA, there are different assertions regarding which side, i.e. 
CEO or shareholders, the power lies with in the pay determination process. Under a managerial 
power perspective, powerful CEOs hire compensation consultants to help them receive and 
“camouflage” excessive pay packages. The pay consultants appreciate the intra-company power 
relationships and align their interests with those of the entrenched CEOs and not the 
shareholders. As Bebchuk et al. (2002) speculate, the threat of CEO involvement in the 
consultant selection process is sufficient enough to incentivize pay consultants to act at the 
CEO’s interest.   
One of the main flaws of MPA, as also pointed out by some of its contenders (Murphy, 2002; 
Weisbach, 2007), is the fact that it is difficult to test empirically. However, many studies take its 
predictions for granted when testing various relationships within corporations (e.g. Hanlon, 
Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2003; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004). Our setting provides a unique 
opportunity to test some of the main predictions of the MPA regarding the level and structure of 
CEO pay as well as the role of pay consultants in this pay determination process. We examine 
two central empirical issues capable of shedding light on the MPA, namely that compensation 
consultants have a direct effect on the structure of the CEO pay contract since they help the 
CEOs justify rent extraction, for example by increasing the cash compensation of CEOs 
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(Bebchuk et al. 2002, p. 790); also that powerful CEOs wish to employ consultants in order to 
facilitate the above process (p. 789).  
We first investigate the effect of consultants on the levels and structure of CEO pay. A 
“ratcheting-up” effect of consultants on the total levels of pay would be in line with the MPA, 
since it would be an indication that pay consultants are being hired by CEOs to assist them with 
the justification of excessive pay. In the same context, any such rent extraction should be mainly 
driven from an increase in the levels of the non-incentive (salary) part of pay, since it is this part 
of compensation that does not require any additional effort from the CEO, as opposed to 
incentive based compensation (short-term bonuses, options and LTIPs) which is normally tied to 
firm performance. Therefore, if the MPA is correct, we should expect a positive effect of pay 
consultants on the salary component of total CEO compensation.  
If the MPA is correct, we would not expect rent extraction by managers to be channeled 
through an increase in the levels and proportions of incentive based compensation. Empirical 
evidence that consultants influence firms towards the choice of more incentive based forms of 
pay, would raise doubts about the MPA. Incentive-based executive pay plans facilitate a risk 
shifting from shareholders to risk-averse managers. There have been cases of mistreatment of 
such plans with the use of schemes which are less sensitive to firm performance, for example the 
options backdating scandal (Bernille and Jarrell, 2009). Still, under the MPA, CEOs, like any 
utility maximizing agent, would prefer to achieve their “excessive” compensation through an 
increase in their basic (salary) part of pay, which is broadly insensitive to performance, and not 
via an increase in their incentive based compensation, even if the latter is less sensitive (than 
optimal) to performance. This is because risk-averse agents would prefer to minimize the risk 
shifting from shareholders to them. According to Hall and Murphy (2002), managers require a 
premium to exchange their cash compensation for stock options, even for in-the-money ones. 
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This implies that an element of risk shifting is present in any form of equity based pay, even the 
sub-optimally set ones. In addition, we believe that such practices are the exceptions to the rule, 
as amply illustrated by the extent of the above mentioned scandal. In markets with high levels of 
transparency, like the US and the UK, these practices are not expected to be widespread and 
systematic. The recent financial crisis, which has put managerial compensation on the spotlight, 
has illustrated that it is systematic widespread errors on incentive setting, rather than issues of 
“camouflaging” that can cause havoc in the markets. The emphasis on short term, market share 
growth incentives, which lead to excessive managerial risk-taking, is highlighted as one of the 
main reasons for the recent crisis (Bebchuk and Fried, 2010).  
Therefore, we argue that a positive relation between equity based pay and the use of pay 
consultants would serve as an indication that consultants urge firms to use pay plans that tie 
managers’ pay to shareholders’ wealth.  
More formally, our three main hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 1: Pay consultants have an increasing effect on the levels of total CEO pay.  
Hypothesis 2: Pay consultants have an increasing effect on the salary level and proportion of 
CEO pay.  
Hypothesis 3: Pay consultants have a non-positive effect on the level and proportion of 
incentive based CEO pay. 
Empirical evidence on the decision to hire a compensation consultant is also potentially 
relevant for assessing the MPA. The notion of CEO power is extremely important in the MPA. 
According to Bebchuk et al. (2002), in all firms with dispersed ownership the CEO has a certain 
degree of power which provides opportunities for rent extraction. However, depending on the 
combination of specific firm/CEO characteristics (e.g. CEO ownership and tenure, board 
independence, existence of large institutional shareholders) the power of the CEO can vary. 
Page 10 of 44
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 11 
Ceteris paribus CEOs achieve higher levels of rent extraction in firms where their power is 
higher. However, a serious impediment to their ability to extract rents is the potential outrage 
costs that their behavior may generate. CEOs thus need the pay consultants to offer “legitimacy” 
to the pay practices adopted by the firm (Bebchuk et al., 2002). Since pay consultants potentially 
play an important role in the rent extraction process, the MPA would predict that powerful CEOs 
will try to be “heavily involved” in the decision to hire a consultant to assist them in the 
justification of their excessive pay. 
Although the decision to hire a consultant in the UK is taken by the compensation committee, 
which consists of non-executive, independent directors, a powerful CEO will indirectly control 
the consultant hiring choice “given the considerable influence of the CEO and the CEO’s 
management team over the board…” (Bebchuk et al. 2002, p. 785). The CEO will then use the 
pay consultant as an additional “tool” for the design and validation of a pay package that will 
serve her personal interests. Therefore, we would expect that the probability of hiring a pay 
consultant increases with CEO power. As Bebchuk et al. (2002, p.789) report there is only 
“anecdotal” evidence that CEOs play an important role in the choice of a consultant. Therefore, 
our setting gives us a unique opportunity to empirically test for this fundamental argument of the 
MPA.  
So our fourth hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 4: The probability of a firm hiring a pay consultant increases with CEO power.  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
We test for the effects of compensation consultants on CEO pay with the use of the following 
regression models: 
 
Level of CEO Pay = β0+ β1*consultant dummy+ β2*other compensation related variables+ εi                 (1)                                                                                                                                                                        
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Proportion of CEO Pay = β0+ β1*consultant dummy+ β2*other compensation related variables+ εi   (2) 
 
In total we run seven different regressions. The first four refer to the levels of CEO pay 
(equation 1), and the dependent variables are total CEO pay, salary, bonus and equity based 
compensation levels. The remaining three refer to the proportions of CEO pay (equation 2) 
where as dependent variables we use three different ratios: salarymix which is calculated by 
dividing salary compensation to total pay, a bonusmix ratio which is equal to cash bonus divided 
by total pay and finally an equitymix ratio which is derived by dividing equity based pay 
(options and LTIPs) to total compensation. Our main independent variable is a consultant 
dummy, which takes the value of one when a firm has hired a consultant and the value of zero 
when it has not hired one. Apart from th  compensation consultant dummy, we also use variables 
that control for firm and market characteristics that the literature has shown as having an effect 
on executive compensation. Extra attention is paid to the definition of the variables that proxy for 
CEO power and board independence since they have an important role in the managerial power 
framework.  
For the effect of CEO power on the choice of hiring a pay consultant we run the following 
probit model where the main dependent variable is the consultant dummy previously described: 
 
Consultant Dummy= δ0 + δ1* CEO power + δ2 * other selection related variables + εi               (3)                           
 
We measure CEO power using variables mentioned in Bebchuk et al. (2002) (i.e. CEO 
ownership and tenure). We additionally control for firm specific characteristics that, based on 
prior literature, we expect to have an impact on CEO power, e.g. corporate governance 
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mechanisms, ownership structure. This gives us the opportunity to explicitly test for the 
conditions that can tilt the power balance between the CEO and the shareholders within a firm’s 
environment. Moreover, we identify, mainly from the auditing literature, a number of additional 
variables that could have an effect on the choice of hiring a consultant.    
Data  
For this study we collect data on UK firms for the year 2006. The existing regulatory 
framework provided the opportunity to have all the necessary information needed for our study. 
According to the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003), firms should inform 
investors about the levels and structure of executive compensation and also about the 
compensation consultants that are hired to assist the compensation committee.  
Our full database consists of 500 firms from the FTSE 100, 250 and Small Cap Indices. 
FTSE 100 represents the 100 firms with the highest capitalisation in the London Stock 
Exchange, FTSE 250 the 101st to the 350th largest firm, while FTSE Small Cap consists of 300 
firms outside the 350 companies included in FTSE 100 and 250. We exclude from our sample 
investment trusts and a small number of firms for which we could not find detailed compensation 
data (in total 150 firms). For executive compensation and consultants’ data we use the BoardEx 
database and we also hand-collect a number of data items from company annual reports. The 
compensation data contains the levels of salary, bonuses, long term incentive plans (LTIPs, 
commonly used in the UK instead of share option schemes) and executive stock options. LTIP 
and option values are taken from BoardEx. For the valuation of LTIPs, BoardEx assumes a 
100% realization of the maximum award of the LTIP schemes whether cash, equity, equity 
matched or option based. Options are calculated based on the latest closing stock price using the 
Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing model. For other accounting and market variables we 
use the Datastream, Thomson One Banker and Fame databases. 
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Other Pay Related Variables 
Firm Size. Firm size has proved to be a factor that significantly affects executive pay. 
Murphy (1985; 1998) shows that firm size is positively correlated with executive compensation. 
This is quite reasonable: The best and most highly paid executives will be attracted by bigger 
firms. Moreover, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) show that in bigger firms, the marginal value of 
the managerial output is higher. As a proxy for firm size we use the book value of the firm’s total 
assets for 2006.  
Firm Risk. According to agency theory managers will receive lower incentives (lower pay 
performance sensitivity) the greater the variance in firm performance (Harris and Raviv, 1979; 
Lambert, 1983). However, whilst a number of studies have found evidence consistent with this 
negative relationship (Aggrawal and Samwick, 1999; Lambert and Larcker, 1987) other studies 
have taken a managerial ownership view to the issue: The riskier the firm environment, the 
higher the information asymmetry between the managers and shareholders and, thus, 
shareholders need to provide managers with higher incentives so as to act for their interests 
(Core and Guay, 1999). So they predict a positive rather than a negative correlation between firm 
risk and managerial incentives. For this reason it is rather hard to predict the effect that firm risk 
will have in our models. To control for firm risk we include the volatility of the firm’s stock 
returns and dummies for the industry in which the firm operates. Volatility is taken from 
Datastream; it is calculated as the standard deviation of the weekly stock price returns during the 
previous 12 months.  
Firm Performance. The performance of the firm has also proved to have a marked effect on 
executive compensation. From an agency theory perspective, the objective of executive pay is 
the alignment of interests between managers and shareholders, so as to ensure that managers act 
to increase shareholders’ wealth. Many studies have tried to calculate to what degree executive 
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pay changes after a change in firm performance. Jensen and Murphy (1990) calculate pay 
performance sensitivities, whereas Murphy (1986) calculates pay performance elasticities. 
However, “neither the sensitivity nor elasticity approach strictly dominates the other” (Murphy, 
1998: 31) as each one proxies for different things. Although both market and accounting based 
variables have been used in other studies to proxy for firm performance, as Conyon, Peck and 
Sadler (2000) point out, a market based measure is more insightful. Therefore, we include in our 
model the annual stock return calculated using data retrieved from Datastream. The choice of the 
compensation measure for the calculation of the changes in executive pay is another issue of 
debate. A number of studies only use changes in the cash part of compensation (salary and 
bonus), ignoring the long term emoluments of a manager, while other studies use changes in total 
compensation. As Conyon et al. (2000) point out, the use of changes in cash based compensation 
could be reasonable for previous decades where the cash component was the most important part 
of executive pay. However, the equity based part of compensation has increased enormously in 
recent years. In order to test these different lines of argument we test the relationship of all 
different types of compensation, i.e. cash and equity based, to firm performance.  
Corporate Governance Variables. Based on agency theory, we should expect large external 
shareholders to affect the determination of executive compensation, so as to make sure that 
managers act in their interests. Studies in this issue are quite limited in number and their results 
are contradictory: Hartzell and Starks (2003) show that institutional investors have a positive 
effect on pay performance sensitivity and a negative effect on the levels of compensation. This 
indicates that their monitoring role has a positive impact on minimizing the agency problems 
between managers and shareholders within a firm. On the other hand, Stapledon (1996) shows 
that institutional investors are not generally concerned with the total levels of executive pay and 
they prefer to affect firm decision making on a private rather than a public level. As a proxy for 
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the influence of large shareholders we include in the model a variable (named Institutional 
Shareholders), which is defined as the sum of the levels of ownership for institutional investors 
with a stake above 10%.2  
CEO tenure is another factor that can affect executive compensation. Murphy (1986) shows 
that the relationship between CEO compensation and stock return declines with CEO tenure. 
This result can be viewed from two perspectives: From an agency theory viewpoint, this can 
mean that as time elapses, firms increase their trust in CEOs and it is easier for them to evaluate 
their productivity, so it is no longer necessary to base their pay on accounting and market targets. 
However, from a managerial power view this could mean that CEOs increase their power within 
the firm as time goes by, so they change their pay structure to suit their own preferences. In line 
with this argument, Fredrickson, Hambrick and Baumrin (1988) use, among other variables, 
CEO tenure as a proxy for the power that the CEO has within the firm. For tenure, we have 
collected the number of years that a CEO is in that position through BoardEx and firms’ annual 
reports.  
Board characteristics. Two main features of a firm’s board have been identified by previous 
studies as significant in the determination of executive pay; the existence and the membership of 
a compensation committee and the proportion of non-executive directors in the firm’s board. A 
number of studies (Main, O’Reilly and Wade, 1994; Newman and Mozes, 1998) have shown that 
the inclusion of an executive director in the remuneration committee leads to higher levels of 
pay. The results by Conyon and Peck (1998) point in the same direction. In our data collection 
we find that a very small number of firms, following the recommendations of the Combined 
Code (2003), have an executive director on their compensation committee, therefore we only 
include in our model the number of compensation committee members. Based on the literature 
on the relation between board, and other (sub)committees’ size and their effectiveness (Carcello 
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and Neal, 2000; Raheja, 2005), we cannot be certain that a larger compensation committee is 
more effective because of the potential existence of bureaucratic and free rider problems. 
However, given that the compensation committee members are all non-executive, it is more 
likely that a larger compensation committee would have a broader range of opinions and consist 
of members with greater/more diverse corporate experiences.  
An internal control mechanism for the managers of the firm is the board of directors which 
should act as the shareholders’ representative (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Greater independence of 
the board leads to increased monitoring of the CEO’s actions. Therefore, it is vital that we 
control for the board composition in our analysis. There have been a number of studies that 
examine the role of the board of directors in the determination of executive pay. Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1989) have shown that the monitoring by the board tends to reduce CEO pay, a result 
supported by Boyd (1994). To proxy for the board independence we include in our analysis a 
ratio of the number of non-executive directors divided by the total members of the board.  
Growth Opportunities. Based on Smith and Watts (1992), firms with higher growth 
opportunities (defined by the book to market ratio as an inverse proxy for them) are expected to 
have higher levels of managerial compensation and use more incentive based plans. In these 
firms, managers cannot be easily monitored and they also operate in riskier environments, hence 
the need for greater alignment of interests. Moreover, firms with high growth potential are 
expected to have lower dividend yield, since they have more investments and lower free cash 
flow (Jensen, 1986). Therefore, we expect that dividend yield to have a negative correlation with 
the levels of executive pay and equity based plans. Thus, we include in our analysis both the 
book to market ratio and dividend yield. Both variables are calculated using data collected from 
Datastream.  
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Leverage. According to John and John (1993), leverage is a factor that affects managerial 
compensation. In levered firms an optimally designed executive pay package minimizes not only 
the agency costs of equity, but also the agency costs of debt. In their theoretical model they 
predict a negative correlation between leverage and pay performance sensitivity. Moreover, 
higher growth firms have less debt (Myers, 1977) and thus lower leverage. As previously 
analyzed this leads to lower levels of compensation and pay performance sensitivity. Therefore, 
we expect a negative correlation between the level of, as well as the portion of incentive based, 
executive pay and leverage.  
Consultant Selection Related Variables 
For the consultant selection model, we use a number of additional exogenous (non-CEO pay 
related) variables, apart from the ones described in the previous part of this paper. 
CEO Power. This effect is of major concern in the selection model. Therefore, in addition to 
CEO tenure, and in order to further control for the effect of CEO power on the decision to hire a 
consultant we include an alternative proxy for it, namely CEO ownership stake, following 
Bebchuk et al. (2002, p. 785). They predict that the higher the CEO’s shareholdings the higher 
their power, e.g. greater influence on the appointment of other directors, greater ability to 
thwart/discourage a hostile takeover. We control for this effect by including in our analysis the 
percentage of the firm’s outstanding shares in the hands of the CEO in 2006. 
Pay Package Complexity. We believe that the complexity of a compensation package is an 
important reason for firms to hire an outside consultant to assist them. For this reason, we 
include the number of equity based plans (options and LTIPs) awarded to the CEO for the year 
as a proxy for a firm’s CEO pay complexity. The higher the number of plans awarded to the 
CEO for the year, the more complex their contract is; therefore, the higher the probability of 
hiring a compensation consultant.3  
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Fees and Location. Based on the auditor independence literature (Abbott, Parker and Peters, 
2003) we use a number of variables that are indicative of the willingness of a firm to seek outside 
consultancy and of the degree of activism of the board of directors, since a more active board of 
directors will have a lower need for outside consultants.. Thus, we include the value of audit fees 
and a ratio of non-audit services fees to total fees. Moreover, the location of a firm can have an 
effect on the fees charged by pay consultants and consequently this could affect the choice of a 
firm to hire a consultant. Unfortunately, data on the fees charged by pay consultants are not 
disclosed. However, we believe that a firm that is located outside London is less likely to hire a 
compensation consultant, since the majority of consultants are based in London. Therefore, we 
include in our model a dummy for the location of the firm (whether it is located in or outside 
London). The values of audit and non-audit fees, and the location of the firm are taken from 
FAME database.   
Industry Competition. Finally, we believe that companies that operate in competitive 
industries will hire a consultant to create optimal contracts in order to increase the likelihood that 
they retain their CEOs. This means that in more competitive and homogeneous industries the 
probability of hiring a consultant is higher. To control for this effect we use the correlations of 
the stock returns of firms operating in the same industries; a high correlation indicates a 
homogeneous, thus more competitive, industry (Lang and Stulz, 1992).  
 
SELECTION BIAS 
A key issue in modelling the effects of compensation consultants on CEO pay is the need to 
test whether the systematic differences in CEO compensation between those firms that have 
hired a pay consultant and those that have not still exist after controlling for potential selection 
bias in the decision to hire a consultant. We need to control whether CEO pay between firms is 
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different due to the use of a pay consultant, after taking into account the fact that firms could 
have hired them for reasons not necessarily relevant to CEO pay. Thus, to test the robustness of 
our results, we incorporate the consultant selection model previously analyzed into our CEO pay 
models.  
The choice of the right selection modeling technique to control for selection bias in this case 
needs to be thoroughly considered. The use of a Heckman (1979) two-step estimator as in other 
relevant studies (Cadman et al., 2010) is not appropriate. This is because there is no self-
selectivity problem in our (different) settings. In other words, even though we agree that the two 
subsamples, i.e. firms with consultants and firms without consultants, are not randomly chosen, 
i.e. selection-bias, we can still observe the CEO packages of firms without a consultant. A 
Heckman estimator would be correct only if we wanted to identify the economic determinants of 
CEO pay in firms with consultants and the CEO pay arrangements in firms without consultants 
were unobservable. This is clearly not the case in our setting. We do observe the pay packages of 
CEOs in firms with no compensation consultants. We simply want to address the non-random 
selection process. Therefore, although we believe that the choice of our exogenous variables is 
appropriate, if we use the Heckman (1979) two-step estimator, the results of the second stage 
equation would only refer to the firms that have hired a consultant and will not answer our 
research questions.  
Another solution would be to run a first stage (probit or logit) selection model and use the 
predicted probabilities as an independent variable to the second stage main regressions. 
However, this technique leads to a miscalculation of the standard errors, so our results will not be 
robust (Heckman and Uzua, 2010). The model we apply is a switching regression model, where 
we have two different regression equations and a criterion function – equation 6, which 
determines the system of equations to be used (Lee, 1978; Maddala, 1985).  
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In our setting, we have a consultant dummy Ci and two forms of pay related variables: Pci, for 
firms with consultants, and Pni for firms without consultants. The equations for these three 
variables are: 
Pci = θc0 + θu1Xci + εci                (4) 
Pni = θn0 + θn1Xni+ εni               (5) 
           Ci= δ0 + δ1Xi + δ2Zi + εi                                                                              (6) 
where 'iX  is the vector of all pay related variables discussed in the previous section and 'iZ  is the 
vector of the exogenous variables related to the consultant selection (i.e.fee ratio, complexity).  
In any case, we can observe the consultant variable Ci and the limited dependent variable Pci 
or Pni. The observed pay related variable depends on the existence of a consultant, so we can 
observe:  
              Pci when Ci=1 and 
Pni when Ci=0, but never both. 
Therefore, we have a simultaneous equations model. An issue with this model, as Lee (1978) 
shows, is that the pay related equations cannot be consistently estimated using ordinary least 
squares. The problem is that  
E(εc|Ii=1)≠0 and E(εn|Ii) ≠0.  
Lee (1978) proposes the following solution to this problem. We first run equation (6) to estimate 
δ0, δ1, δ2 as a normal probit model and get the consistent estimators 210 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ δδδ . Conditional on the 
choice of a consultant the pay related equation for firms with consultants is: 
           c
i
i
cccci F
f
XP ησθθ ε +





Ψ
Ψ
−++= )(
)(
1110                                           (7) 
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where E(ηc|Ii) = 0, Ψi=γ0 + γ1Χi + γ2 Ζi. F is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal 
random variable and f is its density function. Similarly, conditional on the choice of not hiring a 
consultant the pay related equation for firms without a consultant is:  
   n
i
i
nnnni F
f
XP ησθθ ε +





Ψ−
Ψ
−++= )(1
)(
2110                                         (8) 
where E(ηn|Ii) = 0 
The parameters (θcj) can be estimated by regressing the pay related variable Pci on Xci and 
( ))ˆ()ˆ( ii Ff ΨΨ− , where '2'10 ˆˆˆˆ iii X Ζ++=Ψ γγγ . In the same way we estimate the parameters (θnj). 
With this two stage estimation, which Lee (1978) shows it gives consistent estimations, we can 
find the average differences in the levels and the structure of executive pay between firms that 
have a consultant and those that do not; we also control whether these differences are significant. 
We do this by using the predicted values ciPˆ  and niPˆ for each of the pay related variables:  
                                    110
ˆˆˆ
cccci XP θθ += , for firms with consultants and                               (9) 
                                    110
ˆˆˆ
nnnni XP θθ += , for firms without consultants.                                 (10) 
 
The differences are derived by subtracting the predicted values from equations (9) and (10). If 
we find them to be significant, then this will indicate that the effect of a consultant on CEO pay 
still exists, after correcting for selection biases.   
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the number of firms using compensation consultants. 
Almost 75% of the firms in our dataset have hired one or more compensation consultants. By 
index, 86% of the FTSE 100, 88% of the FTSE 250 firms and 52% of the Small Cap firms have 
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one or more consultants. Thus, we observe, as expected, that small firms are less likely to hire a 
compensation consultant. This highlights the need for the examination of many data points of the 
firm size distribution; a small cross-section, based on bigger market capitalization firms, e.g. 
FTSE 100 or FTSE 250, would ignore this size effect. 
From the 366 firms in our sample that do have a consultant, 22% hired two or more. This 
practice is more pronounced in FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 firms, where one out of three and a 
quarter of the firms respectively, hired more than one compensation consultant. On the other 
hand, only 6% of the Small Cap firms hired two or more remuneration consultants. This result is 
an indication of the complexity of executive pay determination in bigger firms, compared to 
smaller firms. It also shows that better resourced firms have the opportunity to employ more 
expert opinions.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
In Table 2, we focus on individual compensation consultants. The first and second columns 
show the number of the firms and their percentages in relation to the total number of 
observations (so, for example, for firms with two consultants we have two observations). In the 
third column, we report the market share of each consultant.  
We observe a very high market share for New Bridge Street consultants. Almost half of the 
firms in our sample have chosen New Bridge Street as their compensation consultant. Towers 
Perrin seem to be the second most dominant “player” in the pay consultant market but, as we 
point out below, with a portfolio of customers of very high quality which comprises mostly of 
firms from the FTSE 100 index. Watson Wyatt, Deloitte & Touche and Kepler Associates follow 
with lower market shares.  
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Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 3 presents an analysis of the portfolio of customers for each consultant. As previously 
mentioned, we find that Towers Perrin is in the first position among FTSE 100 firms with New 
Bridge Street coming second. This indicates that Towers Perrin has a focus on bigger clients. 
New Bridge Street, on the other hand, has a different client-targeting approach focusing 
primarily on smaller clients. As reported in the table, almost 50% of the FTSE 250 and 56% of 
the FTSE Small Cap firms have chosen New Bridge Street as their compensation consultant. 
This result is indicative of a clustering effect and it shows that specific compensation consultants 
aim at specific segments of the UK cross-section.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
  
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics on the variables used in our analysis, while Table 5 
shows the correlations between these variables. We observe that the average total CEO pay in 
our sample is more than 3.0 million USD. Moreover, the average equity based pay (options and 
LTIPs) is more than double the average salary pay at almost 1.6 million USD. The average 
number of option and LTIP packages (CEO pay complexity in the table) is 1.6. For the quartile 
of firms with the highest CEO pay the average complexity increases to 2.51, while for the ones 
in the lowest pay quartile decreases to 0.72 (untabulated results). All our variables are positively 
skewed, while the kurtosis in the pay variables and total assets is relatively high.   
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
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Insert Table 5 about here 
Main Results  
Table 6 shows the results of our main multivariate regressions on the levels of top-executive 
pay. Column 1 illustrates the relationship between the total levels of CEO compensation and 
compensation consultants. The coefficient of the compensation consultant dummy is positive and 
highly statistically significant (t = 2.23, p<.05) . This result is consistent with the “ratcheting up” 
effect of consultants on CEO pay that other studies have shown for US firms (Cadman et al., 
2010; Conyon et al., 2009a; Murphy and Sandino, 2010) and thus we confirm Hypothesis 1. We 
note that Conyon et al. (2009a) did not find this result for their UK sample. The difference 
between their results and ours may be explained by our use of a larger and more comprehensive 
sample. Our result indicates that firms that hire compensation consultants in the UK, as in the 
US, are more likely to have higher CEO compensation levels than those that have not hired a 
consultant.  
Columns 2, 3, and 4 of table 6 show the effect that pay consultants have on the levels of 
different components of the top executive pay package. While US studies (Cadman et al., 2010) 
have shown that firms with pay consultants have higher levels of salaries, bonuses and equity 
based compensation we do not find this to be the case for UK firms, where it appears that 
consultants have no statistically significant effect on the level of the CEO’s salary. This result 
contradicts the findings of Wade et al. (1997) and the relevant prediction of the MPA (Bebchuk 
et al., 2002) that CEOs, with the help of pay consultants, are using the non-incentive part of their 
pay to increase their emoluments. Thus we are unable to confirm Hypotheses 2 and 3 in terms of 
salary and incentive-based pay levels respectively, thereby raising doubts about the predictions 
of the MPA. 
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Table 7 reports the relationship between compensation consultants and the salary, bonus and 
equity based proportions of CEO pay. The coefficients on compensation consultants are also 
highly significant in these specifications. Compensation consultants have a negative effect on the 
salary mix (t = -3.04, p<.01) and a positive effect on the equity mix (t = 2.51, p<.05). Therefore, 
we reject Hypotheses 2 and 3 in terms of non-incentive and equity based proportions of CEO pay 
respectively, thereby raising further doubts about the predictions of the MPA. This result 
indicates that compensation consultants have an increasing effect on pay performance sensitivity, 
since equity based compensation, which typically generates the majority of managerial 
incentives in a pay package, is increased under the advice of a consultant. Our results also show 
that the increase in the total levels of CEO pay that we previously analysed is driven by an 
increase in incentive based compensation and not by salaries. This demonstrates that, after 
controlling for firm size, firm risk, firm performance and corporate governance effects, 
compensation consultants influence firms to choose forms of CEO pay that incentivise managers 
to act in the shareholders’ interests. We also observe that consultants have no effect on the 
proportion of short-term incentive based compensation in the CEO pay package, i.e. cash 
bonuses as a proportion of total pay.  
Tables 6 and 7 also confirm a highly significant firm size effect on the levels and structure of 
CEO compensation. Larger firms have higher levels of CEO pay (t = 5.04, p<.001) and higher 
proportions of long-term equity based pay (t = 4.41, p<.001). On the other hand, large firms have 
lower salary and short-term incentive based proportions of CEO compensation. This result 
indicates that larger firms have a greater preference for long term incentive based forms of 
managerial compensation, most probably because they can bare their cost. Dividend yield is 
negatively correlated with total pay and the proportion and level of bonuses, while book-to-
market is positively associated with salary; these results are consistent with the predicted effects 
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of firm growth opportunities and free cash flow issues discussed in the previous part of this 
paper. Leverage has a negative effect on the levels of total pay and on the proportion of short 
term incentive based pay. The existence of a higher number of non-executive directors is 
positively correlated with the levels and proportions of equity based pay and negatively with the 
proportions of salary and bonuses, which highlights the push of non-executive directors for more 
equity based pay-performance sensitivity. Moreover, an increase in the number of members of 
the compensation committees drives total CEO pay to higher levels but again this is mainly due 
to higher equity based compensation. Finally, as expected, an improvement in firm performance 
results in higher (short-term performance related) bonuses (both in level and as a proportion of 
CEO pay). 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
  
Insert Table 7 about here 
Consultant Selection and Selection Bias 
Table 8 reports the results of the consultant selection models. In Column 1, both proxies of 
CEO power, i.e. CEO tenure and ownership, are not significantly related to the probability of 
hiring a consultant. This is direct evidence against the predictions of the managerial power 
hypothesis and leads us to reject hypothesis 4. Moreover, we observe that complexity, proxied by 
the number of stock option and LTIP schemes awarded to the CEO during the year, is positive 
and highly significant (t = 3.07, p<.01), which shows that the more complex the compensation 
package the more likely the firm is to hire a consultant. From Column 1, we also observe that the 
level of the audit fees and the fee ratio are positively correlated with the probability of a firm 
hiring a consultant. This confirms our expectations that firms with higher propensity to hire 
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outside consultants will also hire a compensation consultant for advice on the determination of 
the CEO pay package. Moreover, we observe that firms with a higher proportion of non-
executive directors in their board and a higher number of compensation committee members are 
more likely to hire a compensation consultant to advise them about the CEO pay package.  
Table 8 also shows the results of the models we have run to control for selection bias. We 
only focus on total levels and the salary and equity proportions of pay as they have been our 
main focus in this study. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the results for firms that have hired a 
consultant and columns 3, 5 and 7 for firms without a compensation consultant. The selectivity 
correction coefficients are highly significant in all models (p<.000 in all cases), which confirms 
the need to correct for selectivity bias. Moreover, we do not observe any other significant 
changes in our results.  
The next step is to subtract the relevant predicted values from the regressions we run and 
check whether the average differences between firms with and without a consultant are 
significant (so we subtract the predicted values for columns 2&3, 4&5 and 6&7). This is what we 
do in Table 9 where we see that the average differences are significant at the 1‰ level. More 
importantly, we show that there is a positive difference in the total levels of pay and the 
proportion of equity based compensation and a negative difference in the salary proportion 
between firms with and without a pay consultant. This confirms our result that the “ratcheting-
up” effect of pay consultants on the levels of CEO pay is driven by an increase in the portions of 
incentive based compensation and a decrease in the salary percentage of pay.  
   
Insert Table 8 about here 
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Insert Table 9 about here 
 
To further test the robustness of our results, we use alternative variable specifications to 
capture the effect of large institutional shareholders on the determination of the levels and the 
structure of CEO pay. In particular, apart for the sum of the levels of ownership for institutional 
shareholders with a stake above 10%, we alternatively use the levels of ownership of the five 
largest shareholders without the use of a 10% threshold and the ownership levels of the top 
institutional shareholder. Moreover, we use different ownership thresholds (5% and 7.5%). We 
observe that the effect of the different ownership variables on the levels and structure of the CEO 
pay does not change (untabulated results). There is also no change in the sign and significance of 
the other independent variables used in the model.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper provides UK results on the influence of compensation consultants on the levels 
and structure of CEO compensation. Previous studies report results that appear to be consistent 
with the managerial power hypothesis predictions. Bebchuk et al. (2002) view compensation 
consultants as co-conspirators with managers seeking to camouflage their pay, so as to avoid 
public outrage, and predict a “ratcheting” up effect of consultants on management compensation.  
We find that a “ratcheting up” effect indeed exists for UK firms similar to that reported by 
previous US studies (Armstrong et al., 2009; Conyon et al., 2009a). However, compensation 
consultants also exert a positive effect on pay-performance sensitivity and a negative influence 
on the cash based proportion of CEO pay. Controlling for firm size, risk and performance, as 
well as corporate governance features, consultants appear to have a positive influence on 
incentive based compensation. These results are still significant after controlling for consultant 
selection issues. 
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We also show that the complexity of a CEO compensation package is an important reason for 
firms to hire a consultant. Importantly, we find no positive relationship between powerful - 
entrenched CEOs and the probability of the firm hiring a compensation consultant. Whilst we 
would not claim that these results conclusively reject the managerial power hypothesis in favor 
of optimal contracting, we can claim that it is not possible to reject the optimal contracting 
hypothesis in favor of the managerial power hypothesis on the basis of our consultant choice 
evidence. 
Since pay consultants data for the US is available from 2006 onwards a comparative panel 
data study between UK and US firms for the use of compensation consultants would be an 
interesting topic for future research. This would allow capturing not only time-series effects but 
also the effect of consultant turnover on the pay levels and structure.  
It should be mentioned that there two main caveats to the interpretation of our results. First, 
we need to point out that quantifying the notion of CEO power is a very complex task. Although 
CEO ownership and tenure have been used in the literature as proxies of CEO power, their 
reliability still remains relatively weak. Field studies of actual CEO behavior would be an 
interesting theme for future research and their conclusions could complement the results of this 
study.   
Second, one could claim that compensation consultants reduce (increase) the cash (equity 
based) component of CEO pay in order to camouflage the extraction of rents, which is still 
achievable by making equity based schemes less sensitive to firm performance, for example by 
using in-the-money stock options. In order to provide a definitive answer to this claim one would 
need details about individual grants, so as to calculate the overall sensitivity of the CEO’s 
portfolio. These details are not readily available. This is a common limitation to all the empirical 
studies mentioned in the review of the relevant literature and is driven by data unavailability; 
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hence our study is not immune to it. Despite this, the “camouflage” argument is in any case 
difficult to substantiate. Also, given the recent public scrutiny over CEO pay arrangements it is 
difficult to see how UK firms, especially the larger, more visible ones, would get away with such 
practices. Finally, our results on the selection of pay consultants are unaffected by the 
camouflage argument. Still, they all point against the predictions of the managerial power 
hypothesis.  
Overall, we believe our results suggest that compensation consultants are not part of the 
agency problem, as claimed by Bebchuk et al. (2002), but can actually be part of the solution to 
the problem of designing an optimal executive pay contract. These results entail important 
practical implications for firms, since the hiring of a compensation consultant can ultimately 
have a positive effect on the design of a CEO pay contract. Firms should concentrate their efforts 
on strengthening the internal governance mechanisms; the hiring of outside, expert opinion can 
help in this direction.  
 
NOTES 
1. According to the managerial power hypothesis these relationships arise when nominally 
independent directors are connected to members of the management team by bonds of 
interest, collegiality, or affinity. 
2. We have also tested different ownership thresholds, i.e. 5% and 7.5%, and the results 
remain qualitatively the same. 
3.  The possibility that it is the consultants who might drive the overall number of option and 
LTIP schemes has concerned us while trying to model this selection process. However, we 
believe that this decision is mostly based on long-term firm practices and can only be 
marginally affected by the current consultant. From an about 10% random sample of our 
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data, we have observed that the number of equity based plans does not substantially change 
over the years, so this decision does not seem to be seriously affected by pay consultants. 
In other words, the current consultants might introduce new schemes while allowing prior 
ones to be phased out (i.e. will not automatically cancel previous schemes). This is also 
argued by Conyon, Peck, Read and Sadler (2009b); firms with higher complexity in their 
pay packages are more likely to hire a pay consultant (p. 8) 
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TABLE 1 
Number of Firms using Compensation Consultants in Aggregate and per Index in 2006 
 
 Number of Firms Without consultants With Consultants Number of Consultants 
    1 2 3+ 
All 500 134 366 282 55 29 
FTSE100 95 13 82 52 17 13 
FTSE250 201 24 177 130 33 14 
FTSE Small Cap 204 97 107 100 5 2 
 
The table reports the number of firms in the sample that have hired a consultant or not, in aggregate and per index. The 
total number of the firms is 500, after excluding mutual funds and firms which we could not get sufficient executive 
pay data for. The table also shows the number of consultants that firms have hired (one, two or three and more). 
 
TABLE 2 
Number of client firms per Compensation Consultant in 2006 
 
The table shows the number of firms that have hired the respective consultant in each row. The total number of firms 
that have used consultants is higher than the number of firms that have a consultant in the sample (366) because some 
firms have hired more that one consultant. 
 
TABLE 3 
Portfolio of client firms per Compensation Consultant and Index 
 
Consultant Number of firms 
 FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE Small Cap 
Deloitte & Touche LLP 11 19 3 
Kepler Associates 13 13 5 
Mercer Human Resource Consulting 10 14 5 
Monks Partnership 2 4 18 
New Bridge Street 25 90 60 
Towers Perrin 27 16 1 
Watson Wyatt 9 15 10 
Consultant Number of Firms using the 
respective consultant 
  
% on number of firms 
with consultants in the 
sample, subject to the use 
of at least one consultant 
Deloitte & Touche LLP 33 9.01% 
Kepler Associates 31 8.46% 
Mercer Human Resource Consulting 29 7.92% 
Monks Partnership 24 6.56% 
New Bridge Street 175 47.82% 
Towers Perrin 44 12.02% 
Watson Wyatt 34 9.29% 
Other 132 36.07% 
Total 502 137.15% 
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Other 40 71 21 
 
This Table shows the number of clients that each compensation consultant has per index. Other consultants are small 
consulting firms with a small market share and other legal firms. 
 
TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean Median St.Deviation Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Total pay 3,155.99 1,866.00 3,830.88 27.00 35,188.00 4.00 19.00 
Salary 778.66 654.00 518,069.90 .00 6,540.00 3.83 32.61 
Bonus 625.78 377.50 886,986.70 .00 9,607.00 4.17 27.55 
Equity Based Pay 1,572.27 618.50 3,070,689.90 .00 35,188.00 5.29 40.02 
Other pay 190.81 95.00 11.98 .00 1,756.00 2.90 9.89 
Salarymix 0.38 0.33 .21 .00 1.00 0.93 3.56 
Bonusmix 0.20 0.19 .16 .00 0.93 1.13 5.05 
Equitymix 0.33 0.36 .25 .00 1.00 0.16 2.26 
Dividend Yield 2.35 2.32 1.69 .00 8.27 0.53 3.19 
Leverage 0.21 0.18 .19 .00 1.33 1.35 6.39 
Book-to-Market 0.45 0.39 .33 -1.20 1.92 0.64 5.47 
Total Assets 25,794.11 984.40 160,270.69 1.00 1,949,167.00 9.80 104.10 
Volatility 5.49 5.00 2.45 .00 20.00 1.60 7.58 
Non-Executives Ratio 0.59 0.60 .12 .00 1.00 -0.21 3.77 
Compensation Committee 3.45 3.00 1.03 .00 8.00 0.70 5.27 
Tenure 5.53 4.30 2.45 .00 39.50 1.60 7.58 
Institutional Shareholders 15.43 10.60 19.16 .00 96.16 1.35 4.26 
Pay Complexity 1.60 1.45 1.41 .00 9.00 1.49 6.74 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics on all variables that we use in our models. Total pay includes the sum of salaries, bonuses, 
LTIPs, options and other pay (e.g. pensions) that the CEOs of the firms in our sample received during 2006. Salarymix is a ratio of 
salary levels to total pay; bonusmix is a ratio of annual bonus levels to total pay, while equity mix is a ratio of equity based pay to total 
pay. The Institutional Shareholders variable is the sum of ownership levels for institutional shareholders with more than 10% of a 
firm’s total stocks. Dividend yield, leverage, book-to-market and volatility are taken from Datastream for the year 2006. CEO tenure 
is the number of years that a CEO is at her position in the firm, as taken from Boardex and the firms’ annual reports. Non-executives 
ratio is a ratio of the number of non executive directors divided by the total number of board members. Pay Complexity is the number 
of options and LTIP packages awarded to the CEO in the year. Compensation committee is the number of the committee members. 
Values in levels of pay and total assets are in thousand USDs.
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Table 5 
Correlation Matrix 
 
This table shows the correlations between the main variables that we use in our models. Total pay includes the sum of salaries, bonuses, LTIPs, options and other pay (e.g. pensions) that the 
CEOs of the firms in our sample received during 2006. Salarymix is a ratio of salary levels to total pay; bonusmix is a ratio of annual bonus levels to total pay, while equity mix is a ratio of 
equity based pay to total pay. The institutional shareholders variable is the sum of ownership levels for institutional shareholders with more than 10% of a firm’s total stocks. Dividend yield, 
leverage, book-to-market and volatility are taken from Datastream for the year 2006. CEO tenure is the number of years that a CEO is at her position in the firm, as taken from Boardex and the 
firms’ annual reports. Non-executives ratio is a ratio of the number of non executive directors divided by the total number of board members. Compensation committee is the number of the 
committee members. The asterisks indicate a 1‰(***), 1%(**), 5%(*) and 10%(†) level of statistical significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Ln(total pay) 1.00               
2 Ln(salary .84*** 1.00              
3 Ln(bonus) .38*** .23*** 1.00             
4 Ln(equity) .48*** .25*** .25*** 1.00            
5 Consultant Dummy .21*** .12** .17*** .28*** 1.00           
6 Institutional Shareholders -.01 -.02 -.07† .03 .00 1.00          
7 Non-Executives Ratio .16*** .06 .00 .21*** .21*** .00 1.00         
8 Compensation Committee .35*** .13** .20*** .25*** .28*** -.05 .24*** 1.00        
9 Ln(Assets) .57*** .24*** .25*** .33*** .27*** -.13** .18*** .39*** 1.00       
10 Dividend Yield .02 .04 -.06 .09* .09* -.01 .02 .16*** .27*** 1.00      
11 Leverage .02* .01 .02 .11** .14** -.05 .07† .12** .23*** .12** 1.00     
12 Book-to Market .00 -.00 -.05 -.02 -.09* -.08† .03 -.09* .14*** .07† -.17*** 1.00    
13 Volatility -.19*** -.14*** -.12** -.04 -.07† .16*** -.06 -.18*** -.19*** -.19*** -.07 -.06 1.00   
14 CEO tenure -.07 -.02 -.07† -.08† -.10* -.08* -.23*** -.10* -.07 -.05 -.04 .04 .00 1.00  
15 Stock Return .04 .00 .22*** .01 .00 -.06 -.11** .03 .04 -.29*** -.08† -.12** .01 .04 1.00 
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TABLE 6 
Linear Regression on Levels of Compensation on Compensation Consultant Dummies and 
other Executive Pay related Variables 
 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 
 ln(total pay) (1) ln(salary) (2) ln(bonus) (3) ln(equity) (4) 
 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 
 
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
Control Variables Institutional Shareholders .00 .00 -.01 .02† 
 
 
(1.05) (.46) (-.87) (1.65) 
 Non-Executives Ratio .62 .07 -2.14 5.21* 
 
 
(1.09) (.16) (-1.19) (2.01) 
 Compensation Committee .08* .01 .40 .45† 
 
 
(1.80) (.23) (1.56) (1.83) 
 ln(Assets)          .23***      .13***         .55***        .60*** 
 
 
(5.04) (3.85) (4.46) (3.59) 
 Dividend Yield -.09* -.03 -.35* .00 
 
 
(-2.26) (-.88) (-2.17) (.01) 
 Leverage -.79† -.45 -1.62 .67 
  (-1.81) (-1.15) (-1.30) (.42) 
 Book-to Market -.24 -.07 -.84 -.91 
  (-1.30) (-.51) (-.88) (-.81) 
 Volatility -.08 -.07 -.17† .10 
 
 
(-1.29) (-1.26) (-1.68) (.75) 
 CEO tenure -.00 -.00 -.06 -.00 
 
 
(-.39) (-.16)  (-1.31) (-.14) 
 Stock Return .06 .02        2.50*** .44 
 
 
(.40)    (.16) (3.22)   (.50) 
Main Explanatory 
Variable 
Consultant Dummy .28* .11 .96† 2.20** 
 
 
(2.23) (1.07) (1.90) (3.18) 
Constant       11.44***    12.08***      5.74***  -5.71* 
  
(17.09) (24.04) (2.65) (-2.04) 
Industry 
Dummies  Yes Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
R-squared  .24 .13 .28 .21 
Observations  500 500 500 500 
 
Total pay is the sum of salaries, bonuses, LTIPs, options and other forms of pay (e.g. pensions) that the CEOs of the 
sampled firms received during 2006. We use the natural logarithm of all dependent variables. The consultant dummy 
takes the value of one when a firm has hired a compensation consultant and zero when it has not. The institutional 
shareholders variable is the sum of ownership levels for institutional shareholders with a more than 10% of a firm’s 
total stocks. Dividend yield, leverage, book-to-market and volatility are taken from Datastream for the year 2006. CEO 
tenure is the number of years that a CEO is at her position in the firm, as taken from BoardEx and the firms’ annual 
reports. Non-executives ratio is a ratio of the number of non executive directors divided by the total number of board 
members. Compensation committee is the number of the committee members. In parentheses we have t-statistics and 
the asterisks indicate a 1‰(***), 1%(**), 5%(*) and 10%(†) level of statistical significance. All estimators are robust. 
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TABLE 7 
Linear Regression on the Proportions of Compensation on Compensation Consultant 
Dummies and other Executive Pay related Variables 
 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 
 Salarymix (1)
Bonusmix
(2) 
Equitymix 
(3) 
 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 
 
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
Control Variables Institutional Shareholders -.00 -.00 .00** 
 
 
(.84) (-1.04) (2.14) 
 Non-Executives Ratio -.18†      -.17**       .32*** 
 
 
(-1.88)    (2.65) (3.27) 
 Compensation Committee -.01 .00 .01 
 
 
(-1.46)     (.31) (.99) 
 ln(Assets)         -.02*** .00       .02*** 
 
 
(-4.43) (1.04) (4.41) 
 Dividend Yield .01 -.01* -.00 
 
 
(1.64) (-2.49) (.14) 
 Leverage .03 -.07* .00 
 
 
(.61) (-1.82)   (.11) 
 Book-to Market .07† -.00 -.05 
 
 
(1.82) (-.04) (-1.21) 
 Volatility -.00 -.00 .00 
  (-.76) (-1.56) (.98) 
 CEO tenure .00 -.00* .00 
  (1.24) (-1.98) (.12) 
 Stock Return -.03 0.04* .00 
 
 
(-1.21   (2.00) (.01) 
Main Explanatory Variable Consultant Dummy        -.07** -.00      .06** 
 
 
(-3.04) (-.35) (2.51) 
Constant            .95***       0.32***     -.38*** 
  
(8.92) (4.41) (-3.64) 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  .29 .20 .24 
Observations  500 500 500 
 
Salarymix is a ratio of salary levels to total pay; bonusmix is a ratio of annual bonus levels to total pay, while equity 
mix is a ratio of equity based pay to total pay. The consultant dummy takes the value of one when a firm has hired a 
compensation consultant and zero when it has not. The institutional shareholders variable is the sum of ownership 
levels for institutional shareholders with a more than 10% of a firm’s total stocks. Dividend yield, leverage, book-to-
market and volatility are taken from Datastream for the year 2006. CEO tenure is the number of years that a CEO is 
at her position in the firm, as taken from BoardEx and the firms’ annual reports. Non-executives ratio is a ratio of 
the number of non executive directors divided by the total number of board members. Compensation committee is 
the number of the committee members. In parentheses we have t-statistics and the symbols indicate a 1‰(***),  
1%(**), 5%(*) and 10%(†) level of statistical significance. All estimators are robust.
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TABLE 8 
Probit Selection Model and Split Linear Regressions controlling for Selectivity Bias 
 
 
 
Dependent Variables  
 
 
All firms 
(1) 
ln(total 
pay) (2) 
ln(total 
pay) (3) 
equitymix 
(4) 
equitymix 
(5) 
salarymix 
(6) 
salarymix 
(7) 
 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Coefficien
t 
Coefficien
t 
Coefficien
t 
 
 
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-
statistic) 
Control Variables Institutional 
Shareholders 
.00 -.00 -.00 .00† -.00 -.00 .00 
 
 
(.63) (-.40) (-1.11) (1.68) (-.39) (-.40) (.84) 
 Non-Executives Ratio 1.20* .41 -.76 .07 -.21 -.03 .43** 
 
 
(2.15) (1.10) (-1.40) (.61) (-1.46) (-.36) (2.80) 
 Compensation 
Committee 
.19* -.01 -.15† -.02* -.05* .02* -.00 
 
 
(2.33) (-.37) (-1.71) (-2.00) (-2.16) (2.09) (-.35) 
 ln(Assets) .05          .17*** .06† .01* -.01         -.01*** .02 
 
 
(1.34) (8.26) (1.88) (2.16) (-1.10) (-3.39) (.28) 
 Dividend Yield .02      -.06** -.08† -.00 -.02* .01* .02* 
 
 
(.69) (-2.66) (-1.98) (-.15) (-2.06) (1.72) (2.27) 
 Leverage .29 -.51*      -1.02** -.06 -.21* .05 .19* 
 
 
(.84) (-2.55) (-2.92) (-1.00) (-2.20) (1.00) (1.98) 
 Book-to Market -.34 -.23† .18 -.01        .17** .00 -.08 
  (-1.64) (-1.96) (.79) (-.48) (2.74) (.15) (-1.23) 
 Volatility -.01 -.00 -.01 .00† .00 -.00 -.00 
 
 
(-.61) (-.46) (-.55) (1.72) (.53) (-1.37) (-.32) 
 Stock Return .04 -.03 -.16 .02 -.03 -.04 -.06 
 
 
(.22) (-.34) (-.75) (.57) (-.58) (-1.57) (-.94) 
 CEO tenure -.00       .01* .01 .00† -.00 -.00 .00 
 
 
(-.25) (2.01) (1.38) (1.86) (-.18) (-.46) (1.26) 
Selectivity Bias Variables Ln(audit fees) .11*       
 
 
(2.48) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fee Ratio         1.13***       
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(3.19) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Location -.08       
 
 
(-.62) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Pay Complexity        .17**       
 
 
(3.07) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CEO Ownership -.52       
 
 
(-.84) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Industry Competition .68       
 
 (.54)       
Constant  -3.04***       13.90***        9.57***         0.73***       -1.03***          .13 1.04*** 
  
(-3.91) (19.80) (14.44) (3.24) (-5.70) (.79) (4.57) 
Industry Dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Selectivity Variable   -4.24***       -4.02***       -1.54***      -1.40***        1.10***        1.41*** 
  
 (-5.06) (-5.02) (-5.69) (-6.38) (5.29) (7.47) 
R-squared  .17 .44            .38           .23           .35           .24 .38 
Observations  500 361 139 361 139 361 139 
 
Selectivity Variable for columns 2,4,6 = -f(γ0+γιΧi+γ2Ζi)/ F(γ0+γ1Χi+γ2Ζi)- Firms with Consultants 
Selectivity Variable for columns 3,5,7=  f(γ0+γιΧi+γ2Ζi)/ (1-F(γ0+γ1Χi+γ2Ζi))- Firms without Consultants 
Predicted from the selection model that we ran for all firms (Column 1 - Z is the vector of the exogenous variables) 
 
Column 1 presents the results of the probit consultant selection model. The dependent variable is a consultant dummy, which takes the value of one when a firm has hired a 
compensation consultant and zero when it has not. In the following columns, we split our sample in firms that have hired a consultant (columns 2, 4 and 6) and firms that have 
not (columns 3, 5 and 7). Total pay is the sum of salaries, bonuses, LTIPs, options and other forms of pay (e.g. pensions) that the CEOs of the sampled firms received during 
2006. Salarymix is a ratio of salary levels to total pay; equitymix is a ratio of equity based pay to total pay. The institutional shareholders variable is the sum of ownership levels 
for institutional shareholders with a more than 10% of a firm’s total stocks. Dividend yield, leverage, book-to-market and volatility are taken from Datastream for the year 2006. 
CEO tenure is the number of years that a CEO is at her position in the firm, as taken from BoardEx and the firms’ annual reports. Non-executives ratio is a ratio of the number of 
non executive directors divided by the total number of board members. Compensation committee is the number of the committee members. Pay Complexity is the number of 
options and LTIP schemes awarded to the CEO in the year. Fee ratio is calculated by dividing non audit fees to total fees. The levels of audit and non-audit fees are taken from 
Datastream and from the firms’ annual reports. Location takes the value of 1 when a firm is located in London and 0 when it is not. Industry Competition is the standard 
deviations of the stock returns of firms operating in the same industries. The selectivity variable is estimated from the selection model that we have run in Column 1 and its 
definition is given on the bottom of the table. Z is the vector of the exogenous variables that we believe that affect the choice of a consultant but do not have an effect on the 
CEO pay. In parentheses we have the t-statistics (z-statistics for column 1) and the asterisks indicate a 1‰(***), 1%(**), 5%(*) and 10%(†) level of statistical significance.
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TABLE 9 
Average Predicted Percentage Differences 
 
Variables Average Predicted Percentage Difference t-statistic 
Ln(total pay) 7.165 332.15*** 
Equitymix 2.488 419.07*** 
Salarymix -1.839 -31.03*** 
 
This table shows the average predicted percentage differences between firms with and without a consultant. The 
predicted values are derived from the models we ran in Table 9. Total pay is the sum of salaries, bonuses, LTIPs, 
options and other forms of pay (e.g. pensions) that the CEOs of the sampled firms received during 2006. Salarymix 
is a ratio of salary levels to total pay; equitymix is a ratio of equity based pay to total pay. The asterisks indicate a 
1‰(***), 1%(**), 5%(*) and 10%(†) level of statistical significance. 
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